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Recently there has been a great deal of interest in studying monetary policy under model uncertainty.
We point out that different assumptions about the uncertainty may result in drastically different
"robust" policy recommendations. Therefore, we develop new methods to analyze uncertainty about
the parameters of a model, the lag specification, the serial correlation of shocks, and the effects of
real time data in one coherent structure. We consider both parametric and nonparametric
specifications of this structure and use them to estimate the uncertainty in a small model of the US
economy. We then use our estimates to compute robust Bayesian and minimax monetary policy
rules, which are designed to perform well in the face of uncertainty. Our results suggest that the
aggressiveness recently found in robust policy rules is likely to be caused by overemphasizing
uncertainty about economic dynamics at low frequencies.
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Uncertainty is pervasive in economics, and this uncertainty must be faced continually by
policymakers. Poor quality of data, unpredictable shocks hitting the economy, econometric
errors in estimation, and a lack of understanding of the fundamental economic mechanisms
are among many diﬀerent factors causing the uncertainty. Often, the uncertainty is so large
that the eﬀects of policy decisions on the economy are thought to be ambiguous. Under such
an extreme uncertainty, any knowledge about the structure of uncertainty, as scarce as it
might be, is very informative and must be useful. In this paper we therefore consider the
structural modeling of the uncertainty relevant for policymaking.
We start by supposing that through some process of theorizing and data analysis, poli-
cymakers have arrived at a reference model of the economy. They want to use this model to
set policy, but are concerned about potential uncertain deviations from it. There are three
component blocks of our uncertainty model: ﬁrst, uncertainty about the parameters of the
reference model (including uncertainty about the model’s order); second, uncertainty about
the serial correlation properties of shocks; and third, uncertainty about data quality. Our
analysis is focused on a simple, empirically-based macroeconomic model developed by Rude-
busch and Svensson (1999) (henceforth, the RS model). In order to specify and measure
the uncertainty about the RS model, we use a Model Error Modeling approach which draws
upon recent advances in the control system identiﬁcation literature due to Ljung (1999). We
then apply both Bayesian and minimax techniques to develop policy rules which are robust
to the uncertainty that we describe. We focus for the most part on Taylor-type policy rules,
in which the interest rate is set in response to inﬂation and the output gap. We also consider
some more complex, less restrictive policy rules, and arrive at essentially the same results.
Overall the RS model and the policy rules we study provide an empirically relevant, but
technically simple, laboratory to illustrate the important features of our analysis.
3Recently there has been a great deal of research activity on monetary policy making
under uncertainty. Unfortunately, the practical implications of this research turn out to be
very sensitive to diﬀerent assumptions about uncertainty. For example, the classic analysis
of Brainard (1967) showed that uncertainty about the parameters of a model may lead to
cautious policy. More recently, Sargent (1999) showed that the introduction of extreme
uncertainty about the shocks in the Ball (1999) model implies that very aggressive policy
rules may be optimal. On the contrary, Rudebusch (2001) shows that focusing on the real
time data uncertainty in the conceptually similar RS model leads to the attenuation of the
optimal policy rule. Further, Craine (1979) and S¨ oderstr¨ om (2002) show that uncertainty
about the dynamics of inﬂation leads to aggressive policy rules. Finally, Onatski and Stock
(2002) ﬁnd that uncertainty about the lag structure of the RS model requires a cautious
reaction to inﬂation, but an aggressive response to variation in the output gap.
The fact that the robust policy rules are so fragile with respect to diﬀerent assumptions
about the structure of uncertainty is not surprising by itself. Fragility is a general feature
of optimizing models. Standard stochastic control methods are robust to realizations of
shocks, as long as they come from the assumed distributions and feed through the model in
the speciﬁed way. But the optimal rules may perform poorly when faced with a diﬀerent
shock distribution, or slight variation in the model. The policy rules discussed above are
designed to be robust to a particular type of uncertainty, but may perform poorly when
faced with uncertainty of a diﬀerent nature. In our view, the most important message of the
fragility of the robust rules is that to design a robust policy rule in practice, it is necessary
to combine diﬀerent sources of uncertainty in a coherent structure and carefully estimate or
calibrate the size of the uncertainty. In other words, we must structurally model uncertainty.
As described above, we assume that policymakers start with a reference model of the
economy. At a general level, model uncertainty can be adequately represented by suitable
special restrictions on the reference model’s shocks. For example, if one is uncertain about
4the parameters of the reference model or whether all relevant variables were included in the
model, one should suspect that the reference shocks might actually be correlated with the
explanatory variables in the model. That is, the reference model’s shocks would now include
“true” exogenous shocks and modeling errors. The model uncertainty can be formulated by
deﬁning a set of potentially true models for these errors, or by “Model Error Modeling.”
One popular way to describe restrictions on the reference shocks (see for example Hansen
and Sargent (2002)) is to assume that the shocks must be of bounded size, but arbitrary
otherwise. We argue that a much more structured model of the shocks must be used to
describe uncertainty relevant to monetary policymaking. In particular, we develop an exam-
ple showing that the Hansen and Sargent (2002) approach may lead to the design of robust
policy rules that can be destabilized by small parametric perturbations. Thus while the
robust rule may resist shocks of a certain size, small variations in the underlying model can
result in disastrous policy performance.
We then turn to the task of formulating an empirical description of uncertainty by model
error modeling. In particular, we discuss and implement both parametric and nonparametric
speciﬁcations for the RS model errors. The parametric speciﬁcation imposes more structure
and results in a probabilistic description of uncertainty. We estimate these parameters using
Bayesian methods, obtaining a posterior distribution which characterizes the uncertainty.
The nonparametric speciﬁcation imposes fewer restrictions, and results in a deterministic
speciﬁcation of the uncertainty. This allows us to calibrate the size of the uncertainty set,
but as it is a deterministic description, we cannot evaluate the likelihood of alternative
models in the set.
After we estimate or calibrate the uncertainty, we use our results to formulate robust pol-
icy rules which are designed to work well for the measured uncertainty. From the parametric
speciﬁcation, we have a distribution over possible models. Therefore for this speciﬁcation
we ﬁnd robust optimal rules which minimize the Bayesian risk. From the nonparametric
5speciﬁcation, we have bounds on the uncertainty set. Therefore for this speciﬁcation we ﬁnd
robust optimal rules which minimize the worst possible loss for the models in the set. This
minimax approach follows much of the recent literature on robust control, and provides a
tractable way of using our most general uncertainty descriptions. While there is the possi-
bility that minimax results may be driven by unlikely models, we focus solely on empirically
plausible model perturbations. Further, for many of our speciﬁcations the Bayesian and
minimax results are quite similar. This suggests both that the stronger restrictions in the
Bayesian framework do not greatly aﬀect results, and that the minimax results are not driven
by implausible worst case scenarios. It is worth noting that in all of our results we assume
that policy makers commit to a rule once-and-for-all. Although this approach is common in
the literature, it is clearly an oversimpliﬁcation. This should be kept in mind, particularly
when considering some of the bad outcomes we ﬁnd for certain policy rules.
Without imposing much prior structure on the model perturbations, the parametric-
Bayesian analysis ﬁnds some attenuation in policy. This is keeping with the Brainard (1967)
intuition. However our nonparametric-minimax analysis ﬁnds that dynamic instability is
a possibility for any policy rule. This suggests the potential for very large losses and very
poor economic performance when policy is conducted using such interest rate rules. However
when we tighten prior beliefs so that instability is deemed unlikely, our results change rather
substantially. In this case, the optimal rule from the Bayesian analysis is slightly more
aggressive than the optimal rule in the absence of model uncertainty. However our minimax
optimal rule is quite close to the no-uncertainty benchmark. But these rules remain relatively
aggressive in comparison with directly estimated policy rules.
Upon further inspection, we ﬁnd that in many cases the most damaging model pertur-
bations come from very low frequency changes. Correspondingly, many of the robust policy
rules that we ﬁnd are relatively aggressive, stemming from policymakers’ fears of particularly
bad long-run deviations from the RS model. In particular, we impose a vertical long-run
6Phillips curve. Thus increases in the output gap would lead to very persistent increases in
inﬂation in the absence of a relatively aggressive interest rate rule. The size of this persistent
component is poorly measured, but has a huge impact on the losses sustained by the policy
maker. However, the RS model is essentially model of short-run ﬂuctuations, and is not
designed to capture long-run phenomena. By asking such a simple model to accommodate
very low frequency perturbations, we feel that we are pushing the model too far. A more
fully developed model would be necessary to capture low frequency behavior.
Further, policy makers are arguably most interested in using monetary policy to smooth
cyclical ﬂuctuations, which justiﬁes focusing on the business cycle properties of the model.
In addition, for technical reasons we ﬁnd a substantial divergence between our parametric
and nonparametric uncertainty speciﬁcations at low frequencies. Thus we believe that for
practical purposes, it is prudent to downweight the importance of the low frequency move-
ments. To tailor our uncertainty description to more relevant uncertainty descriptions, we
reconsider our results when restricting attention to uncertainty at business cycle frequencies
(corresponding to periods from 6 to 32 quarters).
Interestingly, in this case the robust optimal policy rules are less aggressive than when
facing uncertainty at all frequencies. This eﬀect is largest for the minimax speciﬁcation,
which seeks to minimize the worst case. Faced with uncertainty at all frequencies, this
requires relatively aggressive policy rules to guard against the possibility of inﬂation growing
out of control. But when we introduce uncertainty at business cycle frequencies only, then
the worst case scenarios occur at these frequencies, making policy very responsive to cyclical
ﬂuctuation. This comes at the cost of downweighting low frequency movements. Instead
of ﬁghting oﬀ any incipient inﬂation, policy becomes less aggressive, and focuses more on
counter-cyclical stabilization. This contrasts with policymakers worried about low frequency
perturbations, who may be reluctant to try to stimulate the economy in a recession. The
same basic mechanism applies in the Bayesian case, but there policy minimizes the average
7loss across frequencies. Low frequency perturbations again imply more aggressive policy, but
these perturbations are given much less weight when choosing policy rules to minimize the
Bayesian risk. Thus the eﬀects of removing low frequency perturbations is much smaller.
One of the main beneﬁts of our approach is that it allows us to treat many diﬀerent forms
of uncertainty in a uniﬁed framework. However it is also interesting to consider the diﬀerent
sources independently. This allows us to see how the uncertainty channels aﬀect policy rules,
and to determine which channels have the largest eﬀects on losses. These results can provide
useful information for users of similar models, by pointing out the most important parts of
the model speciﬁcation. Echoing our discussion of the fragility of robust rules above, we ﬁnd
that the diﬀerent channels have rather diﬀerent eﬀects. Uncertainty about the parameters
and the lag structure is likely the most important channel. It turns out that many of the
empirically plausible perturbations in this case make the model easier to control, so the
resulting Bayesian rules are attenuated and lead to smaller losses. However for all policy
rules, we ﬁnd that instability is possible under our nonparametric calibration, suggesting
a disastrous worst case. We also ﬁnd that real time data uncertainty may have signiﬁcant
eﬀects on optimal policy rules and their performance. When we restrict our attention to
business cycle frequencies, we again ﬁnd that most of the policy rules become attenuated.
In the next section of the paper we describe the framework for our analysis at a general
level. In Section 3 we present an example highlighting the importance of the model of
uncertainty, and show that parametric and shock uncertainty must be considered separately.
Section 4 describes our application of the Model Error Modeling approach to ﬁnd both
parametric and nonparametric measures of the uncertainty associated with the Rudebusch-
Svensson model. Section 5 formulates robust monetary policy rules based on our uncertainty
descriptions. Section 6 concludes.
82 General Framework
The general issue that we consider in this paper is decision making under model uncertainty.
In particular, we focus on the policy-relevant problem of choosing interest rate rules when the
true model of the economy is unknown and may be subject to diﬀerent sources of uncertainty.
The goal of the paper is to provide characterizations of the empirically relevant sources of
uncertainty, and to design policy rules which account for that uncertainty.
The starting point of our analysis is a reference model of the economy:
xt+1 = A(L)xt + B1(L)ut + B2(L)"t (1)
yt = C(L)xt + D(L)"t; (2)
where xt is a vector of macroeconomic indicators, ut is a vector of controls such as taxes,
money, or interest rates, yt is a vector of variables observed in real time, "t is a vector of
white noise shocks, and A(L);Bi(L);C(L); and D(L) are matrix lag polynomials. Note that
the majority of purely backward-looking models of the economy can be represented in the
above form. In fact, by deﬁning the state appropriately, this system of equations has a
standard state-space form. We consider this form of the reference model because, as will
soon be clear, it accords with our description of the uncertainty.
As mentioned in the introduction, we assume that through some unmodeled process of
trial and error policy makers have arrived at a reference model of the economy. In this paper,
we do not address an important question of how to choose a reference model. Instead, we
assume that the reference model is given, and policy makers are concerned about small
deviations of the true model from the reference one. This is also the starting point of
much of the literature on robustness in economics, as described for example in Hansen and
Sargent (2002). A more ambitious question of what policy a central bank should follow
9under vast disagreement about the true model of the economy is addressed, for example in
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999).








They seek to minimize losses by choosing a policy rule from an admissible class:
ut = f(yt;yt¡1;:::;ut¡1;ut¡2;:::):
The admissible class does not necessarily include the optimal control because the optimality
of a rule may be traded oﬀ with its other characteristics, such as simplicity. In some cases
it is more convenient to discuss policymakers maximizing a utility function, which is simply
the negative of the loss function.
Equations (1) and (2) can be estimated for a time period in the past for which both
real-time data yt;ut and the ﬁnal data xt are available. The obtained estimates can then be
used to compute the best policy rule from the admissible class. The quality of the policy
rule obtained in this way will depend on the accuracy of the reference model. In general,
this model will not be completely accurate. The reference model is likely to be a stylized
macroeconomic model, which for tractability may leave out certain variables or focus only
on the ﬁrst few lags of the relevant variables. While these simpliﬁcations may be justiﬁed
for both practical and statistical reasons, we will show that they can have a large impact on
policy decisions.





















D(L) + ˜ D(L)
´
"t; (4)
where ˜ A(L); ˜ Bi(L); ˜ C(L) and ˜ D(L) are relatively unconstrained matrix lag polynomials of
potentially inﬁnite order. Our assumption allows for a rich variety of potential defects
in the reference model. Econometric errors in the estimation of the reference parameters,
misspeciﬁcations of the lag structure of the reference equations, and misinterpretations of
the real-time data are all considered as distinct possibilities.
We assume that the central bank wants to design a policy rule that works well not
only for the reference model but also for statistically plausible deviations from the reference
model having form (3,4). Formally, such a set can be deﬁned by a number of restrictions
R on the matrix lag polynomials ˜ A(L); ˜ Bi(L); ˜ C(L) and ˜ D(L): The restrictions R may be
deterministic if sets of the admissible matrix lag polynomials are speciﬁed, or stochastic if
distributions of the polynomials’ parameters are given.
We formalize policy makers’ desire for robustness by assuming that they use Bayesian or
minimax strategy for choosing the policy, depending on whether R is stochastic or deter-




where the expectation is taken with respect to distributions of the potential deviations from







11where the maximum is taken over all matrix lag polynomials ˜ A(L); ˜ Bi(L); ˜ C(L) and ˜ D(L)
satisfying the deterministic restrictions R:1
It is needless to say that, at least in principle, the particular structure of the restrictions
R will strongly aﬀect solutions to the above problems. In the next section, we illustrate
importance of this structure through a simple example.
3 Consequences of Diﬀerent Uncertainty Models
It is useful to re-write (3)-(4) to represent the model uncertainty in the form:
xt+1 = A(L)xt + B1(L)ut + wt
yt = C(L)xt + st;
where we deﬁne the “model errors” as:
wt = ˜ A(L)xt + ˜ B1(L)ut +
³
B2(L) + ˜ B2(L)
´
"t; (7)
st = ˜ C(L)xt +
³
D(L) + ˜ D(L)
´
"t;
and ˜ A(L); ˜ Bi(L); ˜ C(L) and ˜ D(L) comply with R: This representation shows that, the un-
certainty may be described by restrictions (7) on the model errors wt and st.
One approach to model uncertainty, similar in spirit to that developed by Hansen and
Sargent (2002), does not impose any special structure on wt and st. Instead, the approach
1Note that in our formulation, the model uncertainty takes form of a one-time uncertain shift in the
parameters or speciﬁcation of the reference model. For an analysis of uncertainty interpreted as a stochastic
process in the space of models see Rudebusch (2001).









tΦ2st) · ´: (8)
The parameter ´ in the above inequality regulates the size of uncertainty, and it may be
calibrated so that the corresponding deviations from the reference model are statistically
plausible. While this approach seems quite general and unrestrictive, not taking into account
the particular structure of wt and st may seriously mislead decision makers. We now develop
an example illustrating this fact. The example considers a practically important situation,
although in later sections we slightly change the policy rules and the loss function we consider.
We consider a two-equation purely backward-looking model of the economy proposed and
estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). This model is the benchmark for the rest of


















(¯ {t ¡ ¯ ¼t) + "y;t+1
The standard errors of the parameter estimates are given in parentheses. Here the variable
y stands for the gap between output and potential output, ¼ is inﬂation and i is the federal
funds rate. All the variables are quarterly, measured in percentage points at an annual rate
and demeaned prior to estimation, so there are no constants in the equations. The variables
¼ and i stand for four-quarter averages of inﬂation and the federal funds rate respectively.
The ﬁrst equation is a simple version of the Phillips curve, relating the output gap and
inﬂation. The coeﬃcients on the lags of inﬂation in the right hand side of the equation sum
to one, so that the Phillips curve is vertical in the long run. The second equation is a variant
of the IS curve, relating the real interest rate to the output gap. A policymaker can control
13the federal funds rate and wants to do so in order to keep y and ¼ close to their target values
(zero in this case). For the present, we ignore the real-time data issues so that our reference
model does not include equations describing real-time data generating process.
In general, the policy maker’s control policy may take the form of a contingency plan for
her future settings of the federal funds rate. Here we restrict attention to the Taylor-type
rules for the interest rate. As emphasized by McCallum (1988) and Taylor (1993), simple
rules have the advantage of being easy for policymakers to follow and easy to interpret. In
our analysis in later sections, we consider simple rules but we also analyze the performance
of feedback rules of a more general form. In this section, we assume that the policymaker
chooses among the following rules:
it = g¼¯ ¼t¡1 + gyyt¡2 (10)
Here, the interest rate reacts to both inﬂation and the output gap with delay. The delay in
the reaction to the output gap is longer than that in the reaction to the inﬂation because
it takes more time to accurately estimate the gap. The timing in the above policy rule is
unorthodox, and is made here to sharpen our results. In later sections we use the more
conventional timing, in which the interest rate responds contemporaneously to inﬂation and
the output gap, and we also consider more general policy rules.
Following Rudebusch and Svensson (1999), we assume here that the policy maker has
the quadratic loss function:









The inclusion of the interest-smoothing term (it ¡ it¡1)2 in the loss function is somewhat
controversial. Our results will not depend on whether this term is included in the loss function
14or not, but we keep it here to again sharpen our results. In later sections we assume, as in
Woodford (2002), that the loss function depends on the level of the interest rate, not the
changes in rates.
If the policy maker were sure that the model is correctly speciﬁed, she could use standard
methods to estimate the expected loss for any given policy rule (10). Then she could ﬁnd the
optimal rule numerically. Instead, we assume that the policy maker has some doubts about
the model. She wants therefore to design her control so that it works well for reasonable
deviations from the original speciﬁcation. One of the most straightforward ways to represent
her doubts is to assume that the model parameters may deviate from their point estimates
as, for example, is assumed in Brainard (1967). It is also likely, that the policy maker would
not rule out misspeciﬁcations of the model’s lag structure. As Blinder (1997) states, “Failure
to take proper account of lags is, I believe, one of the main sources of central bank error.”
For the sake of illustration, we assume that the policy maker contemplates the possibility
that one extra lag of the output gap in the Phillips curve and IS equations and one extra
lag of the real interest rate in the IS equation were wrongfully omitted from the original
model. She therefore re-estimates the Rudebusch-Svensson model with the additional lags.
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Then she obtains the covariance matrix of the above point estimates and tries to design
her control so that it works best for the worst reasonable deviation of the parameters from
the point estimates. For example, she may consider all parameter values inside the 50%
conﬁdence ellipsoid around the point estimates.2
2In the later sections of the paper we discuss a more systematic way of representing and estimating the
15We will soon return to this problem, but for now let us give an alternative, less structured,
description of the uncertainty. In general, we can represent uncertainty by modeling the
















Here we will consider the case ¯ ! 1: The special choice of the weights on errors to the
Phillips curve and the IS equations was made to accommodate the MATLAB codes that we
use in our calculations.
In the extreme case when ´ tends to inﬁnity, our uncertainty will be very large, so the
corresponding robust (minimax) rule must insure the policy maker against a large variety
of deviations from the reference model. It can be shown that such an “extremely robust”















(see Hansen and Sargent (2002)). It is therefore easy to ﬁnd such a rule numerically us-
ing, for example, commercially available MATLAB codes to compute the H1 norm. Our
computations give the following rule:
it = 3:10¯ ¼t¡1 + 1:41yt¡2: (13)
Now let us return to our initial formulation of the problem. Recall that originally we
wanted to ﬁnd a policy rule that works well for all deviations of the parameters of the re-
estimated model (12) inside a 50% conﬁdence ellipsoid around the point estimates. Somewhat
surprisingly, the above “extremely robust” rule does not satisfy our original criterion for
robustness. In fact, it destabilizes the economy for deviations from the parameters’ point
model uncertainty. We also do not restrict our attention to the minimax setting as we do in this section.
16estimates inside as small as a 20% conﬁdence ellipsoid. More precisely, the policy rule (13)
results in inﬁnite expected loss for the following perturbation of the Rudebusch-Svensson
(RS) model:
¼t+1 = :68¼t ¡ :13¼t¡1 + :35¼t¡2 + :10¼t¡3 + :30yt ¡ :15yt¡1 + "¼;t+1 (14)
yt+1 = 1:15yt ¡ :07yt¡1 ¡ :18yt¡2 ¡ :51(¯ {t ¡ ¯ ¼t) + :41(¯ {t¡1 ¡ ¯ ¼t¡1) + "y;t+1:
Let us denote the independent coeﬃcients of the above model, the re-estimated RS model
(12), and the original RS model as c;c1; and c0 respectively.3 Also, let V be the covariance
matrix of the coeﬃcients in the re-estimated model (12). Then we have:
(c ¡ c1)
0V
¡1(c ¡ c1) = 6:15
(c0 ¡ c1)
0V
¡1(c0 ¡ c1) = 5:34:
Both numbers are smaller than the 20% critical value of the chi-squared distribution with
10 degrees of freedom. This may be interpreted as saying that both the original Rudebusch-
Svensson model and the perturbed model are statistically close to the encompassing re-
estimated model. In spite of this, the robust rule leads to disastrous outcomes.
Why does our “extremely robust” rule perform so poorly? It is not because other rules do
even worse. For example, we checked that (a version of) the Taylor (1993) rule it = 1:5¯ ¼t¡1+
0:5yt¡2 guarantees stability for at least all deviations inside a 60% conﬁdence ellipsoid. The
rule (13) works so poorly simply because it was not designed to work well in such a situation.
To see this, note that our original description of the model uncertainty allowed deviations
of the slope of the IS curve from its point estimate. Therefore our ignorance about this
3Recall that the sum of coeﬃcients on inﬂation in the Phillips curve is restricted to be equal to 1.
We therefore exclude the coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst lag of inﬂation from the vector of independent coeﬃ-
cients. Collecting our estimates, these are: c = (¡:13;:35;:10;:30;¡:15;1:15;¡:07;¡:18;¡:51;:41)0; c1 =
(¡:10;:28;:12;:14;:00;1:13;¡:08;¡:14;¡:32;:24)0; c0 = (¡:10;:28;:12;:14;0;1:16;¡:25;0;¡:10;0)0:
17parameter is particularly inﬂuential under very aggressive control rules. It may even be
consistent with instability under such an aggressive rule. However no eﬀects of this kind are
allowed under the unstructured description of model uncertainty. The speciﬁc interaction
between the aggressiveness of policy rules and uncertainty about the slope of the IS curve is
not taken into account. This lack of structure in the uncertainty description turns out to be
dangerous because the resulting robust rule happens to be quite aggressive.
The example just considered should not be interpreted in favor of a particular description
of uncertainty. Instead, it illustrates that when designing robust policy rules, we must
carefully specify and thoroughly understand the model uncertainty that we are trying to deal
with. Robust policy rules may be fragile with respect to reasonable changes in the model
uncertainty speciﬁcation. In the next sections, we therefore use a systematic approach based
on model error modeling to estimate the uncertainty about the Rudebusch-Svensson model
introduced above. Then we use our estimates of the model uncertainty to ﬁnd interest rate
rules which perform well in the face of this uncertainty.
4 Model Error Modeling
As was shown in the previous section, model uncertainty can be reformulated in terms of
restrictions (7) on the errors of the reference model. Hence, to form an empirically relevant
description of the uncertainty, one should ﬁnd a set of models having the form (7) which
are consistent with available data and prior beliefs. We now begin specifying the model
uncertainty model for our application.
4.1 Specifying the Uncertainty Models
We start by adding equations describing the real-time data to the Rudebusch and Svensson’s
reference model of the economy described in the previous section. Such an extension of the
18reference model is important because the central bank’s policy must feedback on the infor-
mation available in real time. As emphasized by Orphanides (2001), there is a substantial
amount of uncertainty in such information. Initial estimates of GDP, and hence the deﬂator
and output gap, are typically revised repeatedly and the revisions may be substantial.
Our reference assumption is that the real-time data on inﬂation, ¼¤
t; and the output gap,
y¤; are equal to noisy lagged actual data, and the noise has AR(1) structure. That is:
¼
¤
t = ¼t¡1 + ´
¼




















The assumption of the AR(1) noise in the real-time data accords with previous studies (see
for example Orphanides (2001) and Rudebusch (2001)). The choice of timing in the above
equations is consistent with the fact that lagged ﬁnal data predicts the real-time data better
than the current ﬁnal data do. This is true at least for the sample of the real-time data on
the output gap and inﬂation for the period from 1987:1 to 1993:04 that we use, which was
kindly provided to us by Athanasios Orphanides from his 2001 paper.
Using the Rudebusch-Svensson data set kindly provided to us (some time ago) by Glenn
Rudebusch, we compute the errors of the RS Phillips curve, e¼
t+1; and the IS curve, e
y
t+1:
Using Athanasios Orphanides’ data, we compute the errors of our reference model for the
real-time data on inﬂation, e
d;¼
t ; and the output gap e
d;y
t .4 We then model the reference
4In our terminology, the “errors” of the real-time data reference equations are simply ¼¤
t ¡ ¼t¡1 and
y¤
t ¡ yt¡1:
19model’s errors as follows:
e
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t = k(L)¼t + ´
¼


















Several structurally distinct misspeciﬁcations of the RS model are consistent with our
model of the errors. First, non-zero functions a;b;d;f; and g imply errors in the coeﬃcients
and lag speciﬁcations in the reference Phillips curve and the IS equations. Note that the
econometric errors in the point estimates of the reference parameters are thus taken into
account. The misspeciﬁcation of the reference lag structure may be interpreted literally
(say, more distant lags of the real interest rate have a direct non-trivial eﬀect on the output
gap), or as indicating omission of important explanatory variables from the reference model.
Second, our inclusion of both inﬂation and the nominal interest rate in the model of the
IS equation error e
y
t+1 allows for the separation of the eﬀect of real and nominal interest
rates on the output gap.5 Finally, non-zero functions c and h allow for rich serial correlation
structure of the shocks to the Phillips and IS curves.
Similarly, for the reference real-time data equations, non-zero functions m and p extend
the possible serial correlation structure of the noise ´ beyond the reference AR(1) assumption.
As to the functions k and n; they model the “news component” of the data revision process.6
To see this, note that the revisions ¼¤
t ¡¼t and y¤
t ¡yt can be expressed in the form (k(L)¡
1 + L)¼t + ´¼
t and (n(L) ¡ 1 + L)yt + ´
y
t respectively. The functions k and n are thus
responsible for the structure of the correlation between the ﬁnal data and the revisions, which
5We thank Glenn Rudebusch for suggesting this extension of the reference model.
6See Mankiw and Shapiro (1986) for a discussion of news versus noise in the revisions of real-time data.
20deﬁnes the news component. Note that, as pointed out by Rudebusch (2001) and Swanson
(2000), the typical certainty equivalence result in linear-quadratic models does not in general
apply to real-time data uncertainty. Certainty equivalence applies when the estimates of the
underlying unobserved states are eﬃcient, but not when there is ineﬃcient noise in the data
revision process. Moreover, for our results below we focus on a restricted class of policy
rules, either of the simple Taylor-type or of a less restrictive class. The classic certainty
equivalence results apply to optimal rules which respond to all state variables (which in our
case would include all of the additional variables in the model error models). Thus even if
there were no additional noise in the data revisions, the coeﬃcients of our policy rules may
change in the presence of this partial information.
One possible extension of our analysis would be to include additional variables in the
model errors. For example, it is not unreasonable to think that the true dynamics of inﬂation
and the output gap should depend on the real exchange rate. Our description of uncertainty
does allow for such a relationship, albeit an implicit one. In this paper, we deal with reduced
form models. Of course, uncertainty about the reduced form dynamics may correspond to a
deeper uncertainty about a background structural model that includes more variables than
just inﬂation and the output gap. However, we could potentially sharpen our estimates of
uncertainty by explicitly including “omitted” variables directly in the error model. We leave
such important extensions of our analysis for future research.
4.2 Estimating the Models
We have structured the compound model uncertainty faced by policymakers via the lag poly-
nomials a(L) through p(L) describing the dynamics of the model errors. The restrictions on
these polynomials may either be parametric or nonparametric. In this section we describe
one parametric and one nonparametric speciﬁcation. We also describe a possible way of for-
















Figure 1: MCMC draws from the posterior distribution of b0 and b1.
mulating empirically relevant constraints for each speciﬁcation. The parametric speciﬁcation
imposes more structure, and allows us to determine a probability distribution over the class
of alternative models. The nonparametric speciﬁcation imposes signiﬁcantly less structure,
but only provides bounds on the class of feasible alternative models. Later when we use our
measures of model uncertainty for policy decisions, these diﬀerences will be crucial.
First, for the parametric case, we assume that a;b;c;d;f;g; and h (which aﬀect the
Phillips and IS curve errors) are fourth order lag polynomials, and k;m;n; and p (which
aﬀect the real-time data errors) are second order lag polynomials. The choice of these
particular orders of the polynomials is rather ad hoc. Looking ahead, we will estimate the
error model using a relatively short sample of the real-time data errors and a longer sample
of the RS errors. Therefore, the polynomials describing the dynamics of the real-time data
errors are chosen to have smaller order than those for the RS model.
We estimate an empirically relevant “distribution of the uncertainty” using Bayesian esti-
mation methods. In particular, we sample from the posterior distributions of the coeﬃcients
22of a;b;c;:::;p and the posterior distributions of the variances of the shocks u and v using
the algorithm of Chib and Greenberg (1994) based on Markov Chain Monte Carlo simula-
tions. We assume diﬀuse priors for all parameters and obtain six thousand draws from the
posterior distribution, dropping the ﬁrst thousand draws to ensure convergence. In Figure
1 we show the MCMC draws from the joint posterior density of the coeﬃcients b0 and b1 on
the zero’s and the ﬁrst degree of L respectively in the polynomial b(L): These parameters
can roughly be interpreted as measuring the error of the RS model’s estimates of the eﬀect
of the output gap on inﬂation. The picture demonstrates that the RS model does a fairly
good job in assessing the size of the eﬀect of a one time change in the output gap on inﬂation
(as most of the points on the graph are near the origin). However, there exist some chances
that the eﬀect is either more spread out over the time or, vice versa, that the initial response
of inﬂation overshoots its long run level. Averaging the draws from the posterior, we can
obtain the point estimates ˆ a;ˆ b;ˆ c;:::; ˆ p of the parameters of our error model. We will need
these estimates to calibrate the non-parametric uncertainty restrictions that we now discuss.
Clearly, restricting the polynomials to be of this speciﬁc order may rule out some plausible
deviations from the reference model. Such an undesirable restrictiveness, together with
the absence of clear rules for determining the orders of the lag polynomials, calls for an
alternative, non-parametric description of the uncertainty. For such a description, we allow
the polynomials a(L);:::;p(L) to be of inﬁnite order. We interpret these polynomials as


















In general, any linear ﬁlter x(L) with absolutely summable coeﬃcients is uniquely deter-






We specify the model uncertainty restrictions in terms of restrictions on the transfer functions
of the ﬁlters a(L);:::;p(L) as follows. For each frequency !; we require that:
¯
¯






¯Γp(!) ¡ ˆ Γp(!)
¯
¯
¯ < Wp(!) (16)
where ˆ Γi(!) and Wi(!) are some complex-valued and positive real-valued functions of fre-
quency, respectively. We interpret ˆ Γi(!) as our best guess about the value of the transfer
function Γi(!) and Wi(!) as a frequency-dependent parameter regulating the size of our
uncertainty about Γi(!): Geometrically, the inequalities (16) restrict possible values of the
transfer functions Γi(!) to lie in circles in the complex plane centered at ˆ Γi(!) and having
radius Wi(!).
The model uncertainty described by the inequalities (16 ) takes a form of the deterministic
set of models alternative to the reference model. Such a set can be made small if the weights
Wi are chosen to be small. Indeed, the uncertainty set can be reduced to a singleton if
Wi = 0: On the contrary, if the Wi are large, then the set is big, and therefore the amount
of uncertainty about the reference model is large.
To calibrate our non-parametric description of the uncertainty to an empirically relevant
size, we use the following strategy. At each frequency point !, a rough idea about the possible
7The requirement of absolute summability of the ﬁlters’ coeﬃcients is not really necessary for our analysis.
For the results in the rest of the paper to remain valid it is enough to assume that the linear ﬁlter preserve
the stationarity of inputs. However, the absolute summability is a standard requirement (see, for example,
Priestley (1981), Ch. 4), and we keep it here.
24values of the transfer functions Γa(!);:::;Γp(!) can be obtained by plotting a cloud of the
MCMC draws of the parametric versions of a(z);:::;p(z) evaluated at e¡i!: Therefore, we
deﬁne our best guesses about the transfer functions at that frequency as:
ˆ Γa(!) = ˆ a(e
¡i!);:::; ˆ Γp(!) = ˆ p(e
¡i!)
where ˆ a;:::; ˆ p are the point estimates of the parametric speciﬁcation of the polynomials
deﬁned earlier in this section. Next, we calibrate Wa(!);:::;Wp(!) so that the circles in the
complex plane with centers ˆ Γa(!);:::; ˆ Γp(!) and radiuses Wa(!);:::;Wp(!) include 50% of
the MCMC draws of (the parametric versions of) a(ei!);:::;p(ei!): The 50% cutoﬀ value is
arbitrary and can be adjusted, but we choose it to focus solely on plausible values of model
uncertainty.
Note that a speciﬁc choice of transfer functions satisfying (16) may be very diﬀerent
from the sampled (parametric) transfer functions. In particular, although the frequency-
by-frequency analysis has a cutoﬀ value of 50%, any resulting ﬁlter pieced together across
frequencies may have a much smaller likelihood of being observed. Even more important,
in our non-parametric description of the uncertainty we discard information about possible
correlations between a(ei!);:::;p(ei!) and consider the direct product of the 50% regions for
a;:::;p: This may ”inﬂate” the uncertainty dramatically. However this method does provide a
tractable, implementable way of capturing model uncertainty without imposing a great deal
of a priori structure on the dynamics of the possible models. This generality is a beneﬁt of
the approach, and is absent from the parametric case we considered above.
To summarize, the greater generality of the above non-parametric description of the
uncertainty comes with two big costs. First, a probabilistic description of uncertainty is
substituted by a deterministic description. Second, the deterministic uncertainty set may
include some irrelevant models because the calibration procedure proposed above is too
25crude. The latter cost can be reduced by introducing more careful calibration techniques
which is an important topic left for the future research. In the next section, we show how
to the use of our measures of uncertainty to set policy.
5 The Robustness of Policy Rules
In the previous section we constructed both parametric and nonparametric model uncer-
tainty sets for the RS model. We now use Bayesian and minimax techniques to analyze the
robustness of Taylor-type rules, and we develop policy rules which are optimal in presence
of the estimated uncertainty.
5.1 Bayesian Analysis
In this section, we numerically solve the Bayesian problem (5), using our estimates of the
parametric uncertainty. Before proceeding, we must address the issue of the loss function.
Since we do not put restrictions on our priors, the posterior distribution of the coeﬃcients
does not have ﬁnite support. Moreover, in our estimates we typically ﬁnd non-negligible
probability that the system will be dynamically unstable. Therefore if we use the typical
quadratic loss (as in RS), non-zero mass will be assigned to inﬁnite loss and any rule will
correspond to inﬁnite Bayesian risk. One solution to this problem is to restrict our priors
to rule out instability and inﬁnite losses. Another solution, which we choose, is to make the
loss function bounded from above. Clearly, the standard quadratic loss functions are only
justiﬁed as a local approximation of the true, non-quadratic loss (see Woodford (2002) for
example). Thus there is danger in extrapolating too far away from the mean, and it is not
clear that the same loss functions are relevant in extremely bad times. Moreover, bounded
utility functions and losses help to avoid the so-called St. Petersburg paradox in which
individuals would risk all of their wealth on a repeated coin toss lottery (see Mas-Colell,
26Optimal Rule Coeﬃcients
Prior Rule Inﬂation Out. Gap Lagged Rates Risk
Type Type g¼0 g¼1 g¼2 g¼3 gy0 gy1 gi1 gi2 gi3
Unin. Complex 0.74 0.77 0.19 0.25 0.30 0.01 0.01 -0.15 -0.05 32.0
Unin. Simple 1.75 0.25 - 36.0
In. Complex 1.28 0.59 0.67 0.21 1.37 -0.33 0.09 -0.09 -0.01 29.0
In. Simple 2.75 1.25 - 29.7
Table 1: The coeﬃcients of the robust optimal Bayesian rules and corresponding Bayesian risk, for both
the complex rules (18) and Taylor-type rules (17) under informative (In.) and uninformative (Unin.) priors.
Whinston, and Green (1995) for a discussion).
We now also drop the interest smoothing objective from the loss function, and instead
suppose that the loss is quadratic in the level of the interest rate.8 Woodford (2002) derives
a loss function of this form, where the interest rate penalization reﬂects the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates and/or increased distortions associated with higher nominal rates.










This states that all situations in which the absolute values of inﬂation or the output gap
are greater than 25% or the interest rate is greater than 25
p
2% ¼ 35% are ranked equally.
This choice, which gives an upper bound on the losses of 3£625 = 1875, is clearly arbitrary.
However our results did not depend much on the precise values chosen.
First, we compute the Bayesian risk for simple Taylor-type policy rules:






t is a four quarter average of the real-time data on inﬂation and y¤
t is the real time
8An earlier version of the paper considered a loss function with a smoothing objective. This did not
substantially change the results. With a preference for smoothing, the overall level of the loss was higher,
but there was no signiﬁcant alteration in the relative performance of diﬀerent policy rules.
27data on the output gap.9 We make our computations on a grid for g¼ going from 1.25 to 4 in
increments of 0.25 and for gy running from 0.25 to 3 in increments of 0.25. By experimenting
with the grid size, we found that this region contains most of the solutions. We refer to
diﬀerent policy rules by the ordered pairs (g¼;gy). We also consider a less restrictive class of
policy rules of the form:
it = g¼0¼t + g¼1¼t¡1 + g¼2¼t¡2 + g¼3¼t¡3 + gy0yt + gy1yt¡1 + gi1it¡1 + gi2it¡2 + gi3it¡3: (18)
The class of rules in (18) allows policymakers to respond to each of the state variables in
the reference model (9). This generalizes (17) by allowing diﬀerent reactions to the diﬀerent
lags of inﬂation and the output gap, and by including lags of the interest rate. Rather than
computing the performance on a grid, here we use a numerical optimization method. The
surface of the risk for the complex rules (18) turns out to have a lot of local minima, so we
experimented with a number of alternative initial conditions. We also tried implementing a
genetic algorithm to minimize the risk, which although it did not converge, did not ﬁnd (in
400 generations of 20 diﬀerent rules each) any outcomes superior to what we obtained.
A surface plot of the estimated Bayesian risk for the Taylor-type rules (17) is shown in
Figure 2. The ﬁgure clearly shows that aggressive reactions to the output gap lead to a rapid
decrease in the performance of the policy rules. This due to the fact that with such policy
rules, many of the deviations from the RS model turn out to be dynamically unstable, and
so are assigned the maximum risk of 1875. Very aggressive responses to inﬂation also result
in poor performance, but performance also deteriorates slightly at the low end of the grid.
Table 1 summarizes our results on optimal policy rules in this environment. The ﬁrst two
9For each MCMC draw, we check whether the corresponding deviation from the reference model is stable
or not. If it is unstable, then we associate maximum loss of 1875 with such a deviation. In cases when the
deviation is stable, we compute the covariance matrix of the stationary normal distribution for (¼t;yt;it=
p
2)0.
Then we simulate 10,000 draws from this stationary distribution and compute the average loss over these
























Response to Inflation Response to the Gap
Figure 2: Estimated Bayesian risk for diﬀerent policy rules under a diﬀuse prior.
lines report the optimal complex rules (18) and Taylor-type rules (17) and the corresponding
risk in the present case. The optimal simple rule is on a boundary of our grid at (g¼;gy) =
(1:75;0:25). (We extended the grid to verify that this is indeed a global minimum.) This
ﬁnding is consistent with the Brainard (1967) intuition that the introduction of uncertainty
should make policy makers cautious, as the optimal simple rule under no uncertainty is
(2:1;1:2). Thus uncertainty results in attenuation. Also notice that the performance of the
simple rules is nearly as good as that of the more complex rules. The long run reactions
to inﬂation and the output gap are nearly the same in the two cases, and the additional
ﬂexibility of the complex rules does not result in much reduction in risk. Further, the
optimal complex rule turns out not to smooth interest rates, as the coeﬃcients on the
lagged interest rates are small and negative at lags two and three. Since we do not assume
an interest smoothing motive, smoothing is not beneﬁcial in this case. However, again
the additional feedback on lagged interest rates is relatively unimportant here in terms of
economic performance, as it is absent in the simple rules.
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Figure 3: Draws from the posterior distribution under a diﬀuse (orange points) and informative (black
points) prior.
As we discussed above, in reality policy makers do not mechanically follow policy rules
in practice, whether simple or complex. In particular, policy makers do not commit to a
rule once-and-for-all, but instead would be likely to abandon a rule leading to bad outcomes.
While all modeling of the choice of policy rules involves some abstractions, this suggests
that we may want to re-think our analysis when very bad outcomes result. Furthermore,
policymakers likely know much more than attribute to them. For example, one may a priori
believe that most of the plausible deviations from the RS model will not result in instability
if policymakers follow a rule which closely approximates their observed historical behavior.
To explore this possibility, we compute another sample of MCMC draws assuming in-
formative priors on the coeﬃcients of the polynomials a;b;d;f; and g.10 Recall that these
polynomials correspond to the eﬀects of the macroeconomic variables in the Phillips curve
10Changing the prior for the polynomials c;h;m; and p, which relate to the serial correlation of the driving
shocks, has little eﬀect on the stability of deviations. We choose not to impose informative priors on the
























Response to Inflation Response to the Gap
Figure 4: Inverse of the estimated Bayesian risk for diﬀerent policy rules under an informative prior.
and IS equation errors. The priors were calibrated so that about 90% of the draws from
these prior distributions resulted in dynamic stability under the famous Taylor (1993) rule
of (1:5;0:5). Such a calibration of the prior distributions changes our posterior distribution
drastically. This is clearly illustrated in Figure 3 which superimposes the MCMC draws from
the posterior distribution of the coeﬃcients b0 and b1 corresponding to the uninformative
and informative priors. The informative priors lead to enormous shrinkage in the posterior
distribution, as the draws are now in a much tighter cloud around zero.
Under the informative priors, Figure 4 shows a surface plot of the inverse of the Bayesian
risk for the simple Taylor-type policy rules in our grid. We report the inverted risk because
a few rules in the grid produce extremely large risk, whereas the majority of the rules
correspond to small risk. Such an unbalanced situation distorts the graph so that it is easier
interpreted when inverted. The last two lines of Table 1 above report the optimal complex
and simple rules and their associated risks in this case. For the simple rules, the minimal
risk of 29.7 is attained by the rule (2:75;1:25). Again this does not represent much of a
31deterioration from the minimal risk of 29.0 attainable with the more complex rules. Further
the long-run responses to inﬂation and the output gap are again quite similar in the two
cases. Moreover, Figure 4 shows that the risk is nearly ﬂat over a wide range, resulting in
a large region of rules with comparable risk. For example, the optimal simple rule under no
uncertainty here corresponds to a risk of 33.1, only a 11% degradation in performance from
the minimum. Our ﬁndings in this case are similar to the results in Rudebusch (2001), who
shows that robustness to many diﬀerent kinds of uncertainty does not result in a substantial
attenuation of the policy response. In fact, our robust optimal rule with informative priors
is more aggressive than the optimal rule in the absence of uncertainty, but the diﬀerence in
losses is slight.
Comparing our results under informative and uninformative priors, we see that having
tighter prior beliefs does not greatly improve the expected performance of rules, but it does
lead to more aggressive policy responses. The optimal rules in the informative case are more
aggressive in their responses to both inﬂation and the output gap than with diﬀuse priors.
This result holds for both the simple and complex rule speciﬁcations. We discussed above
how with a diﬀuse prior, a number of the deviations from the reference model resulted in in-
stability when aggressive rules were used. By downweighting the likelihood of instability, the
informative priors rule out many of these outcomes, and so improve the relative performance
of more aggressive rules. However the corresponding minimal risk only falls by roughly 10%.
5.2 Minimax Analysis
The Bayesian analysis in the previous section is limited to the parametric model of un-
certainty. We now analyze the robustness of policy rules under the much less restrictive,
nonparametric description of uncertainty we discussed above. However, as we noted there,
we do not have a probability distribution over this nonparametric set. Therefore in this
32Optimal Rule Coeﬃcients Worst
Rule Inﬂation Out. Gap Lagged Rates Case
Type g¼0 g¼1 g¼2 g¼3 gy0 gy1 gi1 gi2 gi3 Loss
Complex 1.28 -0.91 0.66 -0.93 1.57 -1.46 0.49 0.26 0.21 72.3
Simple 2.00 1.00 - 79.1
Table 2: The coeﬃcients of the robust optimal minimax rules and corresponding worst-case loss, for both
the complex rules (18) and Taylor-type rules (17).
section we use a minimax approach as in (6), minimizing the worst case loss. For these











We estimate a bound on the worst case loss for each policy rule using the algorithm de-
scribed in Chapter 6 of Paganini (1996). Unfortunately, there are no theoretical guarantees
that the upper bound on the worst possible loss that we compute is tight. However, our
experience with relatively simple uncertainty descriptions suggests that the gap between the
upper bound and the actual worst possible loss is not very large. Moreover, the bound
has an appealing interpretation of the exact worst possible loss under slowly time-varying
uncertainty and a special noise structure (see Paganini (1996)).
We found that nonparametric model uncertainty calibrated using MCMC draws corre-
sponding to an uninformative prior was simply too large to produce interesting results. Since
some of the draws result in instability, the worst case loss was maximal. For such a calibra-
tion, all the simple policy rules on our grid corresponded to dynamic instability in the worst
case. We therefore use the MCMC draws corresponding to the informative prior to calibrate
the uncertainty. Figure 5 shows the inverse of the worst possible losses for the Taylor-type
rules on our grid, and table 2 summarizes the optimal rules in this case. Qualitatively, the
graph is similar to the Bayesian case in Figure 4, with a slightly diﬀerent peak location.























Response to Inflation Response to the Gap
Figure 5: Inverse of the worst case losses for diﬀerent policy rules.
essentially indistinguishable on our grid from the optimal rule under no uncertainty. This
shows that the conventional optimal Taylor-type rule, formulated in the absence of model
uncertainty, possesses strong robustness properties. Even though we incorporate an informa-
tive prior, limiting perturbations which result in instability, we still allow for a broad range
of perturbations from the reference model. The optimal rule under no uncertainty eﬀectively
deals with these perturbations, and results in good performance under both the reference
model (as it was designed to do) and under the worst case model.
The optimal complex rule also has some interesting features. In contrast to the results in
the Bayesian case from Table 1, we now ﬁnd that some interest rate smoothing is optimal, as
the coeﬃcients on lagged interest rates are larger and all positive. However again, this interest
rate smoothing does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect losses, as the optimal simple rule (which clearly
lacks smoothing) only leads to a 10% degradation in performance relative to the minimum.
Also note that the initial responses to inﬂation and the output gap (g¼0 and gy0) are nearly
the same in the minimax case as in the Bayesian case with informative priors, but the rules
34imply rather diﬀerent dynamic behavior. In addition to the diﬀerence in smoothing, this
is further evidenced by the relatively large negative coeﬃcients on inﬂation and the output
gap at higher lags in the minimax case. However, these results should be treated with some
caution. In the next section, we discuss why the nonparametric description of uncertainty
we employ here may not be capturing the uncertainty relevant for policy.
5.3 Uncertainty at Business Cycle Frequencies
In this section we look at a frequency decomposition of the losses of diﬀerent policy rules,
and argue that it may be important to restrict attention to rules which deal with uncertainty
at business cycle frequencies. This is a natural consequence of the common view of monetary
policy as a means of smoothing cyclical ﬂuctuations, but not as a ﬁne tuning instrument for
high frequency variation or as an eﬀective way of promoting long-run economic performance.
In general terms, the Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) model coupled with a policy rule for
the interest rate is a way of transferring economic shocks into outcomes of interest, such as
inﬂation and the output gap. Policymakers arguably should care about the performance of
these target variables at business cycle frequencies. However since the RS model is linear
and time-invariant, this necessarily implies that they must care about oﬀsetting shocks at
business cycle frequencies. In linear time-invariant models, business cycle ﬂuctuations are
due to shocks at business cycle frequencies.
5.3.1 Description and Motivation
We now further describe some reasons why we may want to limit our analysis of uncertainty
to business cycle frequencies. First are the theoretical explanations, reﬂecting the nature of
our reference model as a model of business cycle ﬂuctuations. The others are more technical,
relating to how our parametric and nonparametric uncertainty descriptions diﬀer in their




































Transfer of variance across frequencies, rule optimal under no uncertainty
Figure 6: Frequency decomposition of the performance of diﬀerent models under the policy rule (2.1,1.2),
which is optimal in the absence of uncertainty. Shown are the reference model (solid line), upper and lower
bounds of the 50% conﬁdence band from the Bayesian analysis (dotted lines), and the worst-case model from
the minimax analysis (dashed line).
treatment of high and low frequency perturbations. We now address each of these in turn.
One of the beneﬁts of minimax analysis is that it provides a simple method of diagnosing
possible defects in the model, which also aﬀect the performance of the Bayesian policy
analysis. By inspecting the worst case deviations from the RS model under diﬀerent policy
rules, we found that for moderately aggressive policy rules the biggest losses result from
the deviations at very low frequencies. More precisely, from (16) the biggest losses are
inﬂicted by larger diﬀerences between Γi(!) and ˆ Γi(!) at frequencies ! close to zero. However
very aggressive policy rules can counteract this deterioration of performance, at the cost of
reducing performance at other frequencies.
While we discovered this feature using our minimax results, it also showed up in our
Bayesian analysis as well. Figures 6 and 7 illustrate our ﬁndings. In each ﬁgure we plot a
frequency decomposition of the contributions to the loss of diﬀerent models controlled by




































Transfer of variance across frequencies, relatively aggressive rule
Figure 7: Frequency decomposition of the performance of diﬀerent models under a relatively aggressive
policy rule (3.5,2.5). Shown are the reference model (solid line), upper and lower bounds of the 50% conﬁdence
band from the Bayesian analysis (dotted lines), and the worst-case model from the minimax analysis (dashed
line).
diﬀerent policy rules. In each case we show the performance of the reference model, the
worst-case model from the minimax analysis, and a 50% conﬁdence band of models from the
Bayesian analysis. In Figure 6 we show the performance of these models when controlled by
the simple policy rule (2.1,1.2) which is optimal in the absence of uncertainty, while Figure
7 uses a more aggressive rule of (3.5,2.5).
While we are mostly interested in the frequency decomposition of the losses, a couple of
initial points deserve mention. First, recall that we calibrated our nonparametric description
of uncertainty based on 50% conﬁdence regions for each of the diﬀerent sources of model error.
However in calibrating each channel one-by-one, the resulting joint model has probability
much lower than 50%, as the worst-case model from the minimax analysis is far outside the
50% conﬁdence band from the Bayesian analysis. This suggests that in our minimax analysis
we have not accounted for some potentially important joint dependencies in the model error
37perturbations. But even with our rough calibration, our minimax analysis of policy rules
turns out to be surprisingly close to the Bayesian analysis. A second important feature to
note is that the reference model often has higher losses than those perturbed models in the
50% conﬁdence band. It turns out, as is described further in Section 5.4 below, that some
of the model error perturbations have a beneﬁcial eﬀect. More precisely, by relaxing the lag
structure of the RS model (but retaining a vertical long-run Phillips curve), many of the
perturbed models are easier to eﬀectively control.
For our purposes, it is interesting to compare the performance of the policy rules at
frequencies near zero and at business cycle frequencies. We take the business cycle band to
be those events with periods from 6 to 32 quarters, which corresponds to frequencies from
roughly 0.2 to 1.05. The ﬁgures show that there is a clear tradeoﬀ in the performance of
rules at diﬀerent frequencies. Figure 6 shows that under the benchmark policy rule which is
optimal in the absence of uncertainty, the losses of all models are highest at low frequencies.
As noted above, the performance degradation at low frequencies can be somewhat oﬀset by
choosing a more aggressive policy rule, as Figure 7 illustrates. Now the losses at frequencies
near zero, although still somewhat high, are much lower than before. However this comes at
a clear cost of reducing the performance at business cycle frequencies. Now each model has
another peak in losses between frequencies 0.4 and 0.6, right in the business cycle band. Thus
for less aggressive policy rules, the most damaging perturbations represent deviations in some
of the very long-run properties of the model. This leads the optimal policy rules to become
more aggressive than they otherwise would be, which worsens their cyclical performance.
However, we feel that changing the low frequency properties of the RS model is pushing
the model too far. We mentioned above that policymakers may be naturally concerned
with the target variables at business cycle frequencies, which would justify downweighting
low frequency perturbations. But in addition, the RS model is designed to explain business
















































































Figure 8: MCMC draws (points) and our nonparametric uncertainty bound (circles) at a business cycle
frequency.
based on de-meaned quarterly data, and we make no eﬀort to model the means or any possible
changes in the means over time. Additionally, just as the loss function is best viewed as
a quadratic approximation, the reference model is best viewed as a linear approximation
to a nonlinear true model. The linearization is much more appropriate for business cycle
ﬂuctuations than for deviations which may push the model away from its mean for extended
periods of time. A more fully developed model, for example incorporating growth or explicitly
modeling time variation in the data, would be necessary to seriously consider long-run issues.
Furthermore, some features of our nonparametric methods increase our measurement of
uncertainty at very low and very high frequencies. Recall that (16) deﬁnes the nonparametric
bounds on the transfer functions, which can be viewed as describing a circle in the complex
plane. We calibrate the size of uncertainty by insuring that 50% of the MCMC draws lie
within each circle. Thus the circles provide an approximation of a level set of the empirical



























































Figure 9: MCMC draws (points) and our nonparametric uncertainty bound (circles) at a low frequency.
is nearly “circular”. However the quality of this approximation decreases substantially if the
empirical distribution of MCMC draws is not circular. For business cycle frequencies, the
approximation seems to be quite good, as Figure 8 shows. The ﬁgure plots the MCMC draws
for each Γi(!), with i = a;:::;p; associated with the parametric description, along with the
circle containing the possible Γi(!) for the nonparametric description. The nonparametric
descriptions seem appropriate in this case.
However, if we look at very low frequencies the correspondence breaks down. Recall that
our MCMC draws are based on low (second or fourth) order lag polynomials. At very low
(and very high) frequencies the imaginary parts of the transfer functions as in (15) disappear.
For example, p(L) is a second order polynomial, so its transfer function is:
p(!) = p0 + p1e
¡i! + p2e
¡2i!





















Response to the Gap
Figure 10: Inverse of the worst case losses for business cycle frequency uncertainty.
Clearly for ! very near zero, both sin! and sin2! will be very near zero, so the imaginary
part will be negligible. Only very high order polynomials have signiﬁcant imaginary parts
at low frequencies. An illustration of this is shown in Figure 9, which is similar to Figure 8,
except now for a frequency near zero. This clearly shows that in this case, our approximation
of the clouds of MCMC draws by a circle in the complex plane is not accurate. Exactly the
same logic applies for very high frequencies. Thus our calibration of uncertainty is most
accurate for intermediate, business cycle frequencies.
5.3.2 Results
Based on the theoretical and technical considerations outlined above, we therefore extend
our analysis by truncating uncertainty to be zero except at the business cycle frequencies.
For the parametric analysis, we took the mean model from the posterior distribution of
the MCMC draws as the benchmark, and then only included the contributions to the loss
coming from perturbations at business cycle frequencies. For the nonparametric case, in
41Method Frequencies g¼ gy Risk/Loss
Bayesian, Unin. All 1.52 0.25 35.7
Bayesian, Unin. Business 1.43 0.26 26.1
Bayesian, In. All 2.73 1.18 29.6
Bayesian, In. Business 2.64 1.08 26.3
Minimax All 2.00 1.00 79.1
Minimax Business 1.50 0.50 27.9
Table 3: The coeﬃcients of the robust optimal Taylor-type rules (17), and corresponding Bayesian risk or
worst-case loss, with uncertainty at just at business cycle frequencies.
our calibration we simply set the weights Wa;:::;Wp from (16) to be equal to zero for any






. We then computed the robust optimal simple rules
(17) in the face of uncertainty at business cycle frequencies.11 For the minimax case, we
again looked at rules on the grid, while in the Bayesian case we numerically optimized over
the choice of rule parameters.
Table 3 summarizes our results on optimal policy rules, and Figure 10 plots the inverted
worst-case loss in the minimax case, analogous to Figure 5 above. In all cases, we ﬁnd that
business cycle uncertainty leads to attenuation of the optimal policy rules. The eﬀects are
relatively minor in the Bayesian case, but much more signiﬁcant in the minimax case. As
Figure 10 illustrates, in the minimax case the best rules are those with a relatively small
reaction to both inﬂation and the output gap. The minimal worst possible loss is attained at
(1.5,0.5) and equal to 27.9, which is substantially less than the value of 79.1 for uncertainty
at all frequencies. This result is intriguing because the optimal minimax rule coincides with
the Taylor (1993) rule. In the Bayesian case, with both diﬀuse and informative priors, we
ﬁnd slight attenuation of the policy response.
The direction and diﬀerence in the magnitudes of these eﬀects can be understood by
reference to Figures 6 and 7. In the minimax case, we look for rules that minimize the
peak of the loss function across frequencies. For uncertainty at all frequencies, this requires
11We also computed the optimal complex rules (18) in the minimax case, which gave essentially the same
results as the simple rules we report here.
42a rule more aggressive than the benchmark in Figure 6, which has a huge peak at low
frequencies, but less aggressive than the rule in Figure 7, which lowers the low frequency
peak but induces another one at higher frequencies. But for uncertainty at business cycle
frequencies, the ﬁgures suggest that more passive rules have a lower peak over the relevant
frequency band. This is just what we ﬁnd. The basic idea is the same in the Bayesian case,
but instead of minimizing the peak of the loss function, we now minimize the average loss
across frequencies. Thus the weight put on low frequency perturbations is lower to begin
with, so the eﬀect of focusing on business cycle frequencies is much smaller.
Overall, our results suggest that the aggressiveness of robust policy rules is due to the
eﬀects of ﬁghting oﬀ possible movements in inﬂation and the output gap at very low frequen-
cies. However if policymakers are more concerned with the performance of policy over the
business cycle horizon, they should instead focus on uncertainty at business cycle frequen-
cies. In this case, concerns about long-run issues become less important than counter-cyclical
stabilization. This leads policymakers to choose attenuated policy rules.
5.4 Analysis of Distinct Uncertainty Channels
One of the purposes of this paper was to bring together diﬀerent studies on robustness which
focus on special forms of uncertainty. Therefore, in previous sections, we combined many
diﬀerent sources of uncertainty into one encompassing structure. In this section, we analyze
some of the diﬀerent components of our uncertainty description taken separately. A goal of
this analysis is to ﬁnd out which components of the uncertainty have the largest eﬀects on
policy and on losses. This can be useful for researchers working with similar Phillips-curve-
IS-type models, by showing which parts of the speciﬁcation require the most attention. Our
results here echo the general message we drew from the literature: rules which are robust to
one type of uncertainty may perform poorly when faced with another type.
43Bayesian Minimax Minimax
Uncertainty All Frequencies All Frequencies Bus. Frequencies
Channel g¼ gy Risk g¼ gy Loss g¼ gy Loss
None 2.10 1.20 27.4 2.10 1.20 27.4 2.10 1.20 27.4
Parameters & Lags 1.44 0.55 25.9 - - 1 - - 1
Noise Correlation 2.14 1.36 32.4 2.09 1.35 45.2 1.98 1.18 34.7
Real-Time Data 3.12 1.26 38.7 2.32 1.02 41.5 2.14 0.76 29.8
Table 4: The coeﬃcients of the robust optimal Bayesian and minimax Taylor-type rules and corresponding
Bayesian risk and worst-case losses. Diﬀuse priors on speciﬁc uncertainty channels, with zero prior on
remaining channels.
We now decompose the model uncertainty into its main component parts. These consist
of: (1) uncertainty about the parameters of the reference model and the number of lags
(polynomials a;b;d;f; and g in the error model), (2) uncertainty about the serial correlation
of shocks (c and h), and (3) real-time data uncertainty (k;m;n; and p). We look at the eﬀects
of each of these channels separately. To do this, we simulate diﬀerent MCMC samples, each
6000 draws long, corresponding to a zero prior on all uncertainty except the chosen uncer-
tainty channel. Thus, for example, the MCMC sample corresponding to uncertainty about
the parameters and the number of lags is taken under a zero prior on all the parameters of
our error model except the coeﬃcients of a;b;d;f; and g. The prior on the chosen uncer-
tainty channel is taken to be diﬀuse. After simulating the MCMC samples, we calibrate the
nonparametric description of uncertainty as outlined in Section 4, and then perform both
Bayesian and minimax analysis of the robustness of Taylor-type policy rules. Instead of
analyzing rules on a grid, we now numerically optimize to compute optimal rules. We also
repeat this exercise to focus on the eﬀects of business cycle uncertainty in the minimax case.
Our results are summarized in Table 4, which provides the coeﬃcients of the optimal
Taylor-type rules for the diﬀerent uncertainty channels under the diﬀerent optimization
methods. We also report the corresponding risks or worst-case losses, and for comparison we
list the optimal rule in the absence of uncertainty. The eﬀects of the uncertainty on policy
44rules and losses diﬀer signiﬁcantly in the Bayesian and minimax analysis and across the
diﬀerent channels. For uncertainty about the parameters of the model and the lag structure,
the optimal Bayesian response leads to a considerably attenuated policy rule. Interestingly,
the Bayesian risk in this case is also slightly less than the benchmark loss. This happens
because most of the perturbations of the reference model associated with this uncertainty
turn out to be favorable to policymakers, meaning that the perturbed model can be more
eﬃciently controlled than the reference model. Interest rates need to respond very little
to variation in inﬂation or the output gap in order to ensure good economic performance.
However, even though most of the perturbations in the parametric case are favorable to
policy makers, under our nonparametric calibration we ﬁnd that for any policy rule there
is a chance of instability. Thus the maximum loss is inﬁnite, and no minimax policy exists.
This is similar to our results above, and suggests that an informative prior is necessary to
rule out instability when dealing with this uncertainty channel.12
For uncertainty about the serial correlation properties of the shocks, the policy rules are
relatively unaﬀected in both the Bayesian and minimax cases. Considering uncertainty at all
frequencies, there is a slight increase in the aggressiveness of policy, which again is reduced
by focusing on business cycle frequencies. Overall, the eﬀects of this channel on policy are
minor, with the only signiﬁcant eﬀect that the worst-case loss at all frequencies increases by
about 65%, but by much less at business cycle frequencies. The perturbations to the serial
correlation of shocks do not really alter the dynamic properties of the transmission of changes
in the interest rate to the other variables. Thus these perturbations have little eﬀect on policy
choice, although they may aﬀect losses through increased volatility. Finally, for real-time
data uncertainty the Bayesian and minimax approaches give somewhat diﬀerent answers.
The Bayesian analysis ﬁnds a relatively aggressive policy rule, especially with respect to
12We repeated the minimax analysis for this channel with an informative prior, ﬁnding the resulting optimal
rule (1.69,1.20) with associated worst-case loss of 35.9 at all frequencies. At business cycle frequencies, the
optimal rule is (1.38,0.71) with worst-case loss 22.2.
45inﬂation, and this channel has the largest eﬀect on the Bayesian risk. However, the minimax
analysis suggests a smaller increase in the inﬂation response, and an attenuation of the
response to the output gap. Thus real time data is another important source of uncertainty,
although the policy recommendations depend on whether average or worst case outcomes
are optimized.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed the eﬀects of uncertainty on monetary policy decisions. We
considered three diﬀerent types of uncertainty: uncertainty about the speciﬁcation of a
reference model, uncertainty about the serial correlation of noise, and uncertainty about
data quality. We argued that diﬀerent speciﬁcations of uncertainty may have signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent implications for monetary policy. Further, uncertainty which enters at diﬀerent
frequencies may have substantially diﬀerent eﬀects. It is therefore necessary to model the
uncertainty itself and try to carefully estimate or calibrate the uncertainty model.
We introduced a systematic approach to the formulation of uncertainty relevant for policy
making based on the Model Error Modeling literature. As the name suggests, this approach
describes the uncertainty about an estimated reference model by building models of the
model’s errors. Throughout the paper we focused on a small macroeconometric model of the
US economy proposed and estimated by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999). We formulated
models for the errors of the RS model, focusing on the aspects of uncertainty that are relevant
for that model. We then implemented both parametric and nonparametric descriptions of
uncertainty for the model, and used them to design robust monetary policy rules.
Our parametric description of uncertainty assumed that the model errors could be ﬁt
by simple low-order lag polynomials. We estimated these models using Bayesian methods,
obtaining a distribution over the potential alternative models. For use in policy, this led
46naturally to Bayesian optimization methods to determine policy rules. The robust rule was
thus the policy rule that minimized Bayesian risk over the distribution of potentially true
models. For the nonparametric description of uncertainty, we did not restrict the order
of the error models, but instead calibrated the size of the uncertainty set in the frequency
domain. In particular, we used our parametric estimates so that at each frequency half of the
draws from the posterior distribution were in our chosen sets. Without having a distribution
over this large (but empirically plausible) class of alternative models, for policy purposes we
focused on minimax optimization methods. In this case, the robust rule was the one that
minimized losses under the worst-case scenario consistent with the uncertainty description.
Without imposing much prior knowledge, we found that the Bayesian optimal policy rules
were attenuated relative to the benchmark case of no uncertainty. However the amount of
uncertainty in our nonparametric speciﬁcation was too large to produce sensible recommen-
dations. With uninformative prior beliefs, dynamic instability is a potential outcome for
many policy rules, which suggests a disastrous worst-case scenario. However this result may
not be empirically plausible, particularly for policy which does not strongly deviate from the
past. Therefore we then imposed stronger prior beliefs to downweight the likelihood of in-
stability. We found that the resulting Bayesian optimal policy rule was more aggressive than
in the absence of uncertainty, while the minimax rule was quite close to this no-uncertainty
benchmark. However all of these rules are still relatively aggressive, especially in comparison
to directly estimated policy rules.
Our analysis also showed that very low frequency perturbations often have the most
impact on policy. There is a clear relationship between the aggressiveness of policy rules and
the performance of rules at diﬀerent frequencies. More aggressive rules perform better at low
frequencies, at the cost of deteriorating performance at business cycle frequencies. Since our
baseline model is essentially a model of short-run ﬂuctuations, we felt that it was extreme
to ask it to accommodate very low frequency perturbations. Therefore we recalculated our
47results by restricting attention to business cycle frequencies. In these cases we found that
instead of reacting aggressively, our policy rules were more attenuated than in the absence of
uncertainty. Under some speciﬁcations, our results were quite close to the policy rules that
have been directly estimated. We also analyzed separately the eﬀects uncertainty of each of
the diﬀerent channels. We found that uncertainty about the parameters and lag structure
of the model is probably the most important channel, but that real-time data uncertainty
can also be important for optimal policy rules.
Many important issues are left for future research. For example, in this paper we left
open the question of how to choose a reference model. Additionally, the baseline model that
we used was intentionally simple, and completely backward looking. Much more could be
done to extend both the baseline model that we analyze and therefore the methods we use,
for example to consider forward-looking behavior or unrestricted optimal policy rules. This
paper is only a ﬁrst step in the analysis, but even by focusing on a simple case we ﬁnd some
interesting results. More work remains to be done to accurately measure the uncertainty
relevant for policy. This requires even more careful modeling of model uncertainty.
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